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Approximately 1.2 billion people live in extreme poverty, surviving on less 
than $1 per day.2  In emerging markets, commercial banks generally serve only ten 
to twenty percent of the population, excluding eighty to ninety percent of the 
population from the formal financial sector.3 Many in this “un-banked” population 
could benefit from access to financial services. 
In most developing countries, rural financial markets are based partially on a 
foundation of law and partially on a non-legal foundation of extra-legal (and 
sometimes illegal) activities.4  These legal and non-legal foundations directly 
                                                          
1 2009 JD candidate and Fellow of the Geoffrey H. Palmer Center for Entrepreneurship & the Law 
at Pepperdine University School of Law. 
2 ROBERT PECK CHRISTEN & DOUGLAS PEARCE, CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR 
(CGAP), MANAGING RISKS AND DESIGNING PRODUCTS FOR AGRICULTURAL MICROFINANCE: 
FEATURES OF AN EMERGING MODEL 1 (2005), http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2705/ 
OccasionalPaper_11.pdf. 
3 See MARGUERITE S. ROBINSON, THE MICROFINANCE REVOLUTION: SUSTAINABLE FINANCE FOR 
THE POOR 6 (World Bank Publication 2001). 
4 HEYWOOD W. FLEISIG & NURIA DE LA PEÑA, LEGAL AND REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR 
EFFECTIVE RURAL FINANCIAL MARKETS 1 (Ctr. for the Econ. Analysis of Law 2003).  This principle is 
illustrated in detailed fashion in HERNANDO DE SOTO, THE MYSTERY OF CAPITAL: WHY CAPITALISM 
TRIUMPHS IN THE WEST AND FAILS EVERYWHERE ELSE (Basic Books 2000).  De Soto explains that 
most businesses in developing economies function in the extra-legal sphere, meaning they do not enjoy 
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influence the operation of rural financial institutions.5  This comment will discuss 
the intersection between rural finance and legal systems.  The focus of the paper 
will be on an emerging legal issue in developing countries: integration of 
microfinance institutions with the formal legal framework.  The comment argues 
that the benefits of microfinance regulation outweigh the costs and is divided into 
four sections: The first section is an introduction to microfinance; the second 
section provides an overview of the issue of microfinance regulation;6 the third 
section offers suggestions for specific aspects of a favorable legal framework for 
microfinance;7 the final section analyzes an example of an effective microfinance 
regulation law.8 
I. INTRODUCTION TO MICROFINANCE 
Microfinance organizations aim to help individuals rise out of poverty.9  
Providing access to credit for low income groups that have traditionally been 
excluded from financial markets allows the poor to “expand and diversify their 
                                                          
legal protection and benefits since they are not registered as legal entities.  De Soto describes the 
predicament: “[e]xtralegal businesses are taxed by the lack of good property law and continually having 
to hide their operations from the authorities.  Because they are not incorporated, extralegal 
entrepreneurs cannot lure investors by selling shares; they cannot secure low-interest formal credit 
because they do not even have legal addresses.”  Id. at 155. 
5 FLEISIG & DE LA PEÑA,  supra note 4, at 1.  The legal structure of rural financial institutions 
influences the institutions’ legitimacy and ability to operate efficiently.  Additionally, if institutions 
operate in the extra-legal sphere, they live in fear of government detection.  See DE SOTO, supra note 4, 
at 155.  De Soto states that such fear makes it difficult for institutions to reach their potential, as 
“underground entrepreneurs cannot openly advertise to build up their clientele or make less costly bulk 
deliveries to customers.”  Id. 
6 See infra note 34. 
7 See infra note 104. 
8 See infra note 199. 
9 The website of Unitus, a leader in the microfinance industry, provides an overview of the history 
of microfinance: 
Microfinance emerged in the 1970s as social innovators began to offer financial 
services to the working poor — those who were previously considered “un-
bankable” because of their lack of collateral. Once given the opportunity, not 
only did clients of [microfinance institutions] expand their businesses and 
increase their incomes, but their high repayment rates demonstrated that the poor 
are capable of transforming their own lives given the chance. This model of 
lending disproved all conventional thinking. Microfinance was born. Since then, 
microfinance has become one of the most sustainable and effective tools in the 
fight against global poverty. 
Unitus, The Microfinance Solution, http://www.unitus.com/unitus-in-action/background-poverty-and-
microfinance/the-microfinance-solution (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). 
Further, the Unitus website briefly explains the fundamentals of microfinance: 
The most common microfinance product is a microcredit loan — usually less 
than $100. These tiny loans are enough for hardworking micro-entrepreneurs to 
start or expand small businesses such as weaving baskets, raising chickens, or 
buying wholesale products to sell in a market. Income from these businesses 
provides better food, housing, health care and education for entire families, and 
most important, additional income provides hope for a better future. 
Id.  Unless otherwise indicated, this paper refers only to microfinance in developing countries. 
Microfinance in wealthy countries presents drastically different issues. 
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economic activity, increase their incomes, and improve their self-confidence.”10  
The Consultative Group to Assist the Poor, a World Bank sponsored consortium of 
globally respected donors, explains: 
Empirical evidence shows that, among the poor, those participating in microfinance 
programs who had access to financial services were able to improve their well-
being both at the individual and household level much more than those who did  not 
have access to financial services.11 
Access to microfinance services can broaden the economic opportunities 
available to many individuals of the developing world.  The only alternative 
sources of financial services to many who are excluded by the formal sector are 
informal money lenders and loan sharks.12  Such lenders take advantage of the 
plight of the poor and charge exorbitant interest rates that are typically five to 
twenty times higher than most microfinance organizations.13 
Many empirical studies demonstrate the positive effects of microfinance 
programs.14  Microfinance programs have proven effective at increasing incomes 
and reducing vulnerability.15  Research indicates that such financial benefits also 
lead to a positive social impact.16  Microfinance programs typically target women, 
and studies have demonstrated that such access to financial services has improved 
the status of women: 
There is strong evidence that access to financial services and the resultant transfer 
of financial resources to poor women, over time, lead to women becoming more 
confident and assertive. Access to finance enables poor women to become 
economic agents of change by increasing their income and productivity, access to 
markets and information, and decision-making power.17 
The strong body of evidence demonstrating its positive impact has led 
microfinance to garner much support.  Muhammad Yunus, pioneer of the 
microfinance movement and founder of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, was 
                                                          
10 ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 37. 
11 CGAP, http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.26.1306/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2009). 
12 Informal money lenders and loan sharks are individual lenders who conduct transactions directly 
with their clients.  See A.C. KULSHRESHTHA, TREATMENT OF INFORMAL SECTOR FINANCIAL 
ACTIVITIES INCLUDING OWN MONEY LENDERS IN THE SNA 1 (2004), 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/nationalaccount/AEG/papers/m4MoneyLendersKulsh.pdf.   Their clients are 
typically the poor and illiterate members of society who have no hope of qualifying for a loan from 
commercial sources.  Id. 
13 ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 16-17. 
14 See Jonathan Morduch, Analysis of the Effects of Microfinance on Poverty Reduction (NYU 
Wagner Working Paper Series, Paper No. 1014, 2002) (Providing a helpful overview of such studies). 
15 See ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 9. 
16 See responsAbility Social Investment Services AG, The Social Impact of Microfinance and How 
to Measure It, http://www.thinkmicrofinance.org/wp-content/uploads/2006/12/discuspaper2.pdf (last 
visited Mar. 11, 2009). 
17 CGAP, http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.26.1306/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2009). 
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awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2006.18  The United Nations legitimized the 
effectiveness of microfinance by anointing 2005 as the “International Year of 
Microcredit.”19  Each year, influential world leaders such as the Queen of Spain, 
the Queen of Jordan, and the First Lady of South Africa attend conferences 
organized by the Microcredit Summit Campaign.20  Globally, there are 
approximately 3,000 microfinance organizations serving over 130 million poor 
clients.21 
While microfinance has expanded significantly, the movement remains far 
from reaching its potential.  After thirty years of industry effort, there is still a 
large gap between the supply and demand for microfinance services.22  At current 
growth rates, in 2010 there will still be 395 million un-served individuals who 
desire access to microfinance.23  This slow growth is due to the fact that most 
microfinance institutions (MFIs) rely on a limited pool of donor funds to finance 
their operations.24  As MFIs move towards securing growth capital from financial 
markets, they will be able to grow more rapidly.25  Favorable banking laws for 
microfinance can play a key role in enabling MFIs to reach this objective.26 
 For decades, credit cooperatives and development finance institutions have 
                                                          
18 Dr. Yunus received the Nobel Peace Prize jointly with the Grameen Bank.  See Nobelprize.org, 
Peace 2006, http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2006/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).  In his 
book, Banker to the Poor, Dr. Yunus recalls that in 1974 he was teaching economics at Chittagong 
University in southern Bangladesh, when the country experienced terrible famine in which thousands 
starved to death.  MUHAMMAD YUNUS, BANKER TO THE POOR vii (1999).  He noted that the thrill he 
had once experienced from studying economics and teaching his students elegant theories that could 
supposedly cure societal problems left him entirely unsatisfied.  Id. at viii.  Yunus visited the nearby 
village of Jobra, where he learned the real-life economics of the poor.  Id. at viii – ix.   He wanted to 
help, and he designed several plans.  Id. at ix.  One plan was more successful than the others: offering 
poor individuals tiny loans for self-employment.  Id.   Grameen Bank was born and an economic 
revolution had begun. 
19 In furtherance of its efforts to reach the Millennium Development Goals, the UN launched a 
year-long campaign to promote microfinance.  The official UN website for the International Year of 
Microcredit states, “[t]he Year of microcredit 2005 calls for inclusive financial sectors and 
strengthening the powerful, but often untapped, entrepreneurial spirit existing in communities around 
the world.”   International Year of Microcredit 2005, http://www.yearofmicrocredit.org/ (last visited 
Mar. 1, 2009). 
20 The Microcredit Summit Campaign is a publicity campaign that works to “ensure that 175 
million of the world's poorest families, especially the women of those families, are receiving credit for 
self-employment and other financial and business services by the end of 2015.”  Microcredit Summit 
Campaign, http://www.microcreditsummit.org (last visited Mar. 1, 2009).  In its efforts to achieve this 
stated goal, the Microcredit Summit Campaign collects data from MFIs around the world and organizes 
annual best-practice conferences.  Id. 
21 The statistics are based on published estimates from the Microcredit Summit Campaign.  See 
SAM DALEY-HARRIS, STATE OF THE MICROCREDIT CAMPAIGN REPORT 2007 (2007), 
http://www.microcreditsummit.org/pubs/reports/socr/EngSOCR2007.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2009). 
22 See id. 
23 This figure is based on CGAP data and population growth rates from the UN population division.   
Unitus, www.unitus.com. 
24 Id. 
25 Id.; see infra note 90. 
26 A substantial portion of this comment is dedicated to this issue.  See infra section II. 
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provided access to credit to customers that commercial banks have neglected.27  
Legal charters govern the financial operations of these organizations and allow 
them access to savings or other public sources of funding.28  During the past two 
decades, many innovative methodologies for delivering microfinance services have 
emerged.29 Development of such innovation has been led by non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), “who typically do not have a legal charter authorizing them 
to engage in financial intermediation.”30 
Currently, there is much discussion among governments, practitioners, and 
donors about new legal structures for microfinance.31  Many countries have 
regulatory laws specifically tailored to the microfinance sector.32  There are clear 
costs and benefits to microfinance regulation.33  The following section provides an 
overview of microfinance regulatory issues. 
II. MICROFINANCE REGULATION AND SUPERVISION 
To reach large numbers of people, microfinance must operate through 
institutions that are licensed and supervised by a country’s financial authorities.34  
A licensed institution can offer savings services to its clients and increase its own 
                                                          
27 ROBERT PECK CHRISTEN & RICHARD ROSENBERG, CGAP, THE RUSH TO REGULATE: LEGAL 
FRAMEWORKS FOR MICROFINANCE 1 (2000), http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2699/Occasional 
Paper_04.pdf. 
28 Id. 
29 Id.  Two leading microfinance models are the Grameen Bank model and the village banking 
model.  The Grameen Bank model consists of group lending, and was pioneered by the Grameen Bank.  
See YUNUS, supra note 18; see also Grameen Bank, Credit Lending Markets, http://www.grameen-
info.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=43&Itemid=93 (last visited Mar. 11, 2009).  
Village banking is a lending methodology developed by FINCA International.  See Glenn Westley, 
Village Banking: Joining the Mainstream, 7 MICROENTERPRISE DEV. REV. 1, 1 (2004).  A village bank 
is an informal self-help support group of 20-30 members, predominantly female heads-of-household.  
Id. at 2.  These women meet once a week in the home of one of their members to avail themselves of 
working capital loans, a safe place to save, skill training, mentoring, and motivation.  See also FINCA, 
Microfinance and Village Banking, http://www.villagebanking.org/site/c.erKPI2PCIoE/b.2394109/ 
k.BEA3/Home.htm  (last visited Mar. 11, 2009). 
30 CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 27, at 1. 
31 See generally STEFAN STASCHEN, REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS FOR MICROFINANCE: A 
COMPARISON OF LEGAL FRAMEWORKS IN 11 COUNTRIES WORLDWIDE (Eschborn 2003), 
http://www.intercooperation.ch/finance/download/divers/staschen-comparision-between-countries.pdf.  
See also RICHARD ROSENBERG ET AL, DONOR BRIEF NO. 12: REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF 
MICROFINANCE (May 2003), http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.9.2415/. 
32 For example, Uganda passed the Microfinance Deposit-taking Institution Act in 2003, 
establishing a unit within the Bank of Uganda to regulate microfinance deposit-taking institutions 
(MDIs).  DAVID KALYANGO, UGANDA’S EXPERIENCE WITH THE REGULATORY AND SUPERVISORY 
FRAMEWORK FOR MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 9 (Bank of Uganda 2005).   The act allows for wider 
access to public funds and places minimum capital requirements of 15% of risk weighted assets on all 
MDIs.  Id. See generally STATSCHEN, supra note 31 (where the author compares the regulatory 
frameworks and relevant laws in eleven countries). 
33 See infra note 56. 
34 ROSENBERG ET AL., supra note 31, at 1. 
2009 MICROFINANCE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 399 
 
capital by capturing deposits.35  Microfinance is substantially different from 
conventional banking; therefore, “[the banking and regulatory laws] in most 
countries will eventually need some adjustment to accommodate licensed 
microfinance.”36 
Financial regulation includes prudential and non-prudential aspects.37  The 
purpose of the prudential aspect is to control systemic risk in the financial system 
and to protect depositors.38  Microfinance institutions that receive deposits from 
the general public need prudential regulation.39  Prudential regulation mandates 
capital adequacy requirements and rules for provisioning loan losses; it also 
requires a supervisory process to ensure compliance.40  Granting a license to a 
“regulated” institution portrays the government’s stamp of approval for the 
soundness of the institution.41 
There is a growing consensus that not all MFIs need to be regulated.42  
Specifically, donor-funded, credit-only MFIs that do not receive deposits from the 
general public do not need to be formally regulated.43  Regulatory resources should 
be primarily reserved for larger institutions, and caution should be exercised when 
                                                          
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Prudential regulation refers to regulation that is designed specifically to protect the financial 
system as a whole while also protecting small deposits in individual institutions.  See ROBERT PECK 
CHRISTEN ET AL., GUIDING PRINCIPLES ON REGULATION AND SUPERVISION OF MICROFINANCE (2003), 
http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/template.rc/1.9.2787/ [hereinafter Microfinance Consensus Guidelines].  
When a deposit-receiving institution becomes insolvent, its failure could send a signal to the public, 
leading to a run on deposits.  Id.  Prudential regulation refers to the government’s oversight of the 
financial soundness of the regulated institutions.  Id.  The government aims to ensure that licensed 
institutions remain financially viable or stop receiving deposits if they become insolvent.  Id.; see also 
CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 27. 
38 See ROSENBERG ET AL,, supra note 31.  Systemic risk refers to the risk that affects the entire 
market or system, and not just specific participants.  See also Aaron Jones, Promotion of a 
Commercially-Viable Microfinance Sector in Emerging Markets, 13 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 
187, 200 (2006). 
39 See Microfinance Consensus Guideline, supra note 37. 
40 See ROSENBERG ET AL,, supra note 31; see also Jones, supra note 38, at 201. 
41 See CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 27.  Some requirements are non-prudential, not 
because they are insignificant, but because they do not require the government’s financial authority to 
vouch for, or assume responsibility for, the soundness of the institution.  Id. at 9.  Such regulation 
includes consumer protection measures, external audits, and certain disclosure requirements.  Id.  
42 Id.; see also Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37; HENNIE VAN GREUNING ET AL., 
A FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS (Dec. 1998), 
http://www.mfc.org.pl/doc/backgroundmaterials/A_Framework_for_Regulating.pdf. 
43 See CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 27.  These institutions are too small to cause systemic 
risks and they do not create risks to depositors.  The task of supervising many smaller institutions would 
be burdensome on the regulatory authority, and could divert resources from the primary objective of 
maintaining the safety and soundness of the banking system.  See ALEX COUNTS & SHARMI SOBHAN, 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CREATION OF A PRO-MICROCREDIT REGULATORY FRAMEWORK ( 2001), 
available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/35924_file_10.pdf. 
With the growth of the microfinance sector, many countries are home to thousands of small 
institutions offering microcredit.  See Mix Home Page, http://www.themix.org/.  Many of these 
institutions have less than 1,000 borrowers; it would be an inefficient allocation of financial and 
administrative resources for the regulatory body to supervise all of them. 
400 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. II:2 
 
regulating smaller deposit-taking MFIs.44  “Regulation of [smaller] institutions 
may be impracticable because proportionately more regulatory resources and costs 
are required to regulate them, while their small size and community focus may 
make private peer supervision by members and depositors more effective.”45 
Regarding the issue of which regulations to apply to MFIs, a growing body 
of research argues that regulations and supervisory tools should be adapted to the 
unique characteristics of the microfinance sector.46  Some countries have 
developed legal “windows” that are dedicated to microfinance and under which 
MFIs are regulated and licensed.47  Adapting the existing framework to the needs 
of microfinance may be more likely to attract existing financial institutions to 
microfinance.48  However, local factors will determine the feasibility of such an 
option.  Lawmakers may be hesitant to expand the existing banking laws to reach 
microfinance, as such a practice could lead to further, unrelated, reconsiderations 
of banking issues.49 
In determining whether certain characteristics of microfinance banks justify 
special adaptation from existing regulatory laws, there are several factors to 
consider.  While a bank is a bank—whether it is small or large, basic or complex—
it may be beneficial to examine several distinguishing aspects of microfinance 
banks.  The client base of MFIs differs from that of commercial banks as MFI 
borrowers are poor entrepreneurs typically working in the informal economy, 
rather than working for registered, formal businesses.50  The lending 
methodologies differ, as lending decisions in MFIs are based on character and are 
rarely backed by conventional collateral, whereas conventional banking loans are 
based on sophisticated analysis of financial statements and are backed by tangible 
assets.51  The structure and governance of MFIs are unique.  Taking loans to a 
widely dispersed rural clientele typically results in a decentralized structure, rather 
than the centralized and bureaucratic structure of most commercial banks.  
Together with the lending methodology this accounts for high transactional costs 
                                                          
44 See Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37. 
45 Jones, supra note 38; see also CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 27, at 10-11. 
46 See Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37; see also CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG,  
supra note 27; Jones, supra note 38. 
47 Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37, at 9.  Such windows can be helpful as the 
microfinance sector begins maturation, but may not be necessary at further stages of development of the 
sector.  At an early stage, the desired regulatory impact can be accomplished by adapting general 
banking laws to the specific needs of microfinance.  CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra  note 27.  This 
practice will allow regulators and legislators time to acquire more expertise with the microfinance 
sector and to consider which regulations will balance the twin objectives of creating a welcoming legal 
framework that allows MFIs to flourish and adequately addressing safety and soundness concerns.  Id. 
48 Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37, at 9.  Commercial financial institutions may 
be more likely to do business with MFIs that operate under the same banking laws.  Additionally, it 
may make mergers between MFIs and commercial banks more logistically feasible.   See infra note 
227-28. 
49 Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37. 
50 JAY K. ROSENGARD ET AL., MICROFINANCE DEVELOPMENT IN KENYA: K-REP’S TRANSITION 
FROM NGO TO DIVERSIFIED HOLDING COMPANY AND COMMERCIAL BANK 1 (June 2000). 
51 Id. 
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for most microfinance institutions.52  MFI portfolios are comprised of a high 
volume of small, short-term loans rather than more efficient larger, long-term loans 
that are typical of retail banking portfolios.53  Deposits in MFIs are primarily from 
low-income community-based savers, rather than highly mobile short-term 
investors.54  These characteristics distinguish MFIs from commercial banks and 
support the notion that MFIs should be regulated differently.55 
A. Challenges for microfinance regulation 
While there is a general understanding that regulation of microfinance has 
positive results for the sector,56 it is not without challenges.  As microfinance 
institutions are unique in structure, regulatory supervision poses issues that do not 
arise in the commercial banking sector.57 
Banking supervisors in many developing countries supervise a commercial 
banking system with extreme structural problems, often including many struggling 
large banks.58  The collapse of one of these banks (many countries face the 
potential of numerous collapsing banks) could threaten the country’s financial 
system with implosion.59  While managing bank risk, the supervisor may have to 
handle political ramifications, as “the owners of banks are seldom 
underrepresented in the political process.”60  If a bank supervisor shows resistance 
to adding MFIs—mostly small institutions offering uncollateralized loans and 
posting small profitability numbers—to his or her list of responsibilities, it is 
important to acknowledge that his or her rationale may be better than outright 
disregard for the poor.61 
When a supervising body determines to oversee MFIs, it will face many 
challenges. The most basic challenge arises from ownership structure.62 For 
                                                          
52 Id.; see infra note 179. 
53 ROSENGARD ET AL., supra note 50, at 1. 
54 Id. 
55 See supra notes 46 & 47. 
56 See HENNIE VAN GREUNING ET AL., supra note 42; see also, ROBIN YOUNG & LAUREN MITTEN, 
LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR MICROFINANCE: A DESK STUDY ( Feb. 
2000) Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37. 
57 GREUNING ET AL., supra note 42 
58 CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 27, at 3.  This portion of the paper refers frequently to a 
“banking supervisor.”   Id.  This term refers to the individual supervisor or the supervisory body that is 
charged with regulating the country’s financial system.  Id.  Typically, this is the role of a country’s 
central bank.  Id. 
59 Id.  Implosion refers to a sudden inward collapse of the institution, the effects of which would be 
felt by the entire financial system.  This is a similar concept as systemic risk.  See supra note 38. 
60 Id. 
61 Id.  Supervisors in developing countries typically have their hands full with problems among the 
commercial banks.  See, e.g., Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37.  Because of the 
existing difficulties even without inclusion of risky MFIs, supervisors can appear reluctant to add MFIs 
to their supervisory responsibilities.  Id. 
62 ROBERT PECK CHRISTEN & RICHARD ROSENBERG, THE RUSH TO REGULATE: LEGAL 
402 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. II:2 
 
commercial banks, ownership generally includes wealthy individuals with their 
own money at risk in the bank.63 Such owners desire a financial return from the 
bank and have a personal interest in the bank’s success. They have an incentive to 
monitor the bank’s manager to ensure that management is consistent with the long-
term financial health of the bank.64  These owners play a role in the line of defense 
for the safety of the bank;65 as such, they help the supervising body with its job of 
maintaining stability in the financial system. 
Most MFIs are under different ownership structures than commercial banks.  
Nearly all MFIs have a governing board that provides independent management of 
oversight.66  Where board members serve for altruistic reasons and do not have 
large amounts of personal wealth at risk in the MFI, they tend not to monitor 
management’s actions as scrupulously as business investors do.67  This ownership 
situation is not a surface level dilemma that can be solved by a banking license and 
regulation by the supervising body.  It is a deeply rooted issue that can only be 
solved when the ownership moves more into the hands of people who have 
personal financial interests in the success of the institution.68 
The difference between bank owners with personal money at risk and owners 
without it becomes most apparent when the institution incurs financial 
difficulties.69  A capital call is one of the supervising body’s most effective 
regulating tools.70  Bank owners are likely to comply with such calls in order to 
preserve the capital they have already committed to the bank.71  While capital calls 
can be effective with commercial banks, they lose much of their influence when 
                                                          
FRAMEWORKS FOR MICROFINANCE 6 (Dec. 1999), http://www.gdrc.org/icm/govern/regulation.pdf. 
63 Id. 
64 Id. 
65 Id.  These owners play a role in ensuring the safety of the bank as they are self-interested in the 
bank’s financial success.  Id.  Naturally, they will motivate the managers to perform well. If the 
managers do not meet expectations, the owners can make the decision to replace them.  Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id.  Of course there are exceptions, but boards of NGOs are in large measure more relaxed about 
their financial institution’s financial viability than their commercial banking counterparts.  Id.  This 
should not be taken as any derogatory shot at such boards; it is not a question of quality of board 
members, but is simply a reflection of the structure of their incentives.  While such is currently 
accurate, the trend is moving more towards hiring proven business minds to the boards of non-for-
profits.  See Elizabeth Littlefield &Richard Rosenberg, Microfinance and the Poor: Breaking Down the 
Walls Between Microfinance and the Formal Financial System, 41-2 FIN. & DEV. 38 (June 2004), 
available at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2004/06/pdf/littlefi.pdf. 
68 CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 6; see also supra note 61. 
69 CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 8. 
70 A regulating tool is a way in which a supervisor ensures the solvency of the institutions she 
oversees.  Id.  A capital call is when the supervisor instructs bank owners to put more capital into the 
bank or the institution will be shut down.  Id.  Such calls are issued to ensure the long-term viability of 
the institution and to minimize systemic risk.  See id. 
71 Id.  As indicated, commercial bank owners are typically wealthy individuals who can come up 
with additional money on short notice.  In fact, many countries make such readily accessible capital an 
important condition to obtaining a license.  CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 8. 
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applied to MFIs.72 
Another supervisor’s tool is to order a halt to new lending until a problem is 
taken care of.  While effective for commercial banks, this tool is not as applicable 
to MFIs.73  A commercial bank can stop new loans without jeopardizing the ability 
to collect on its existing loans; MFIs do not enjoy such liberty.74  MFI clients are 
motivated to repay loans by their expectation of reliable and responsive future 
services.75  If the MFI “denies prompt follow-up loans to clients who have 
punctually repaid prior loans, the MFI is breaching an implicit contract with its 
customers, many of whom will stop repaying their existing loans the minute the 
word gets out.”76  Thus, an order for an MFI to stop its lending can wipe out the 
institution’s loan portfolio if kept in place for very long.77 
The cost of supervision is another challenge to regulating the microfinance 
sector.  Supervisory agency costs are relatively low in the case of commercial 
banks, and can usually be passed on to the banks and their customers.78  Costs for 
supervising MFIs are “likely to be much more expensive, given the MFIs’ 
generally smaller asset base, their much larger number of accounts, their high 
degree of decentralization, and finally the more labor-intensive nature of 
inspecting their portfolio.”79  In addition to the costs to the supervisor, the 
                                                          
72 Id.  This point is illustrated by the experience of Finansol, an MFI in Colombia.  Finansol had 
suffered deep loan losses, reducing its cushion of owners’ capital.  See Carlos Vasconcellos & Solange 
Monteiro, How Not to Manage a Microfinance Institution: The Microfinance Industry’s Most Common 
Errors Affect the Entire Chain of Small and Microenterprises MICROENTERPRISE AMERICAS, 2003,  
available at http://www.iadb.org/sds/mic/micamericas/eng/3/pages30.33.pdf.   The Colombian bank 
supervisor issued a capital call.  Id.  The principal owner of Finansol was the NGO Corposol, which had 
no additional funds to contribute to the rescue.  Id.  Finansol’s closure and the consequential loss of the 
NGO’s investment would not affect the personal pocket books of the NGO’s board members.  Id.  
Naturally, the board members decided not to dig into those pocket books to infuse more money into the 
failing finance company.  See CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 8. 
73 CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 5; see also Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, 
supra note 37, at 26. 
74 CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 5. 
75 Microfinance borrowers are reliant on continual access to loans.  Access to future loans is 
contingent upon borrowers’ timeliness of repayments, so the borrowers are motivated to make 
consistent payments.  If borrowers learn that an MFI is ordered to temporarily halt lending, the 
borrowers may lose motivation to make timely repayments on current loans.  See id. 
76 Id. at 8. 
77 Id.  This principle is illustrated by the example of Finansol, a licensed MFI in Colombia.  See 
Vasconcellos & Monteiro, supra note 72.  The Colombian bank supervisor issued a lending halt to 
Finansol because of escalating repayment problems.  Id.  Three months after issuing the lending halt, 
the supervisor declared Finansol to be insolvent, as loan losses had wiped out over half of its equity 
during the year.  Id.  The lending freeze had worsened Finansol’s repayment problem; when clients 
learned that they would not get new loans, many stopped paying their old loans.  Id. 
78 CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 11. 
79 Id.  For example, a decentralized MFI with 10,000 clients could expect to incur supervision costs 
of one to five percent of assets, which would likely be passed on to the MFI and its clients.  Id.  This 
raises an important issue in determining whether it is beneficial to supervise MFIs, as it becomes a 
fragile balance of costs and benefits of doing such.  This does not imply that MFIs are unable to absorb 
such costs; rather, the high spreads and loan interest rates allow a sufficient cushion for many MFIs.  Id.  
Additionally, some governments with a favorable outlook for microfinance may be willing to subsidize 
these costs by allowing MFIs to pay the same percentage of assets as commercial banks.  Id. 
404 BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP, & THE LAW Vol. II:2 
 
supervised institution incurs substantial costs.80  Such costs can typically equal 
about five percent of the portfolio in the MFI’s first year of operations.81  The 
Consultative Group to Assist the Poor estimates that the cost of supervision can be 
up to five percent of total costs during the first year of regulation and declines to 
about one percent for the ensuing years.82  However, many of the initial costs 
associated with regulation involve internal improvements required to meet 
supervisory benchmarks.83  Most of these improvements benefit the institution in 
the long-term, as they are necessary for operating a viable microfinance 
institution.84 
In addition to the financial burdens, there are non-monetary costs to 
regulation.  Regulation can hinder competition and can stifle innovation.85  The act 
of writing a set of rules for microfinance entails the supervising body making 
decisions as to which types of institutions are the best to do microfinance.86  This 
may limit some institutions; boundaries are drawn and experimentation outside 
those boundaries can be squelched.87 
B. Benefits to microfinance regulation 
ACCION International, a leading microfinance organization whose network 
of partners has lent over $23 billion to over seven million people,88 conducted a 
study on the costs and benefits of microfinance regulation.89  With the exception of 
                                                          
80 Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37, at 28. 
81 Id.  For example, BancoSol’s chief financial officer estimated costs of regulation to his institution 
at five percent for the first year, with the percentage declining in later years.  See CLAUDIO GONZALEZ-
VEGA ET AL., BANCOSOL: THE CHALLENGE OF GROWTH FOR MICROFINANCE ORGANIZATIONS (Aug. 
1996),http://www.microfinance.com/English/Papers/Bolivia_BancoSol_ 
Growth.pdf.  Once the institution reaches scale, the costs of supervision are insignificant.  Id.  
BancoSol’s financial manager estimates that reporting to the supervisory body costs one percent of its 
lending portfolio.  See, CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 6. 
82 See Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37, at 28; see also Elisabeth Rhyne, Senior 
Vice President, Research, Dev. and Pol’y, ACCION Int’l, Presentation of The Experience of 
Microfinance Institutions With Regulation and Supervision at the 5th International Forum on 
Microenterprise 2 (Sept. 10, 2002) (transcript available at 
http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/14184_Rhyne.doc). 
83 See Rhyne, supra note 82. 
84 Id. 
85 Id.  By placing too many restrictions on the institutions it regulates, a supervisory body can limit 
the institution’s ability to experiment and innovate.  See COUNTS & SOBHAN, supra note 43. 
86 See CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 10; see also Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, 
supra note 37. 
87 CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 12.  This is not merely a theoretical concern.  For 
many years, Latin American microfinance NGOs experimented with microcredit products and 
methodologies that were inconsistent with the legal provisions of the regulated financial system.  See id.  
Without such experimentation, it is questionable that microfinance in the region would have blossomed 
as it has.  Id. 
88 See ACCION, http://www.accion.org/NETCOMMUNITY/Page.aspx?pid=492&srcid=254 (last 
visited Apr. 3, 2009). 
89 The study consisted of detailed interviews with microfinance institutions from six countries in 
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one, all of the institutions in the study had experienced transformation from NGO 
status to a formally regulated institution, and thus were able to compare the 
experiences of doing business in an unregulated versus a regulated environment.90  
The results indicate that the institutions were overwhelmingly pleased to be 
regulated, as all reported that the benefits of regulation outweighed the costs.91  
The institutions indicated that the process of becoming regulated had led to many 
benefits, namely: 1) “greater access to sources of funds for both equity and debt 
financing, especially commercial sources”;92 2) greater ability to expand services 
to serve more clients;93 3) improved operations by meeting stricter control and 
reporting standards;94 4) more flexibility in offering products beyond microcredit, 
especially savings and transfers;95 and 5) legitimacy in the commercial sector and 
enhanced credibility with clients.96 
The licensing process can be lengthy and several institutions noted that this 
was the most difficult aspect of being regulated.97  Nonetheless, they indicated that 
“most of the internal improvements they were required to make during this process 
were beneficial, in areas such as internal control, reporting capabilities, branch 
physical security, and the like.”98  Typically, the minimum capital requirements are 
higher for formalized institutions than for NGOs.99  It is important to note that 
meeting the higher capital requirements was not a major issue for the institutions in 
the survey.100  Most of the institutions reported that “the minimum capital needed 
was the same or less than the amount of capital needed to achieve and maintain 
profitable operations, and therefore, it did not pose a binding constraint.”101 
While the challenges to microfinance regulation may be substantial, the 
institutions in ACCION’s study indicate that such impediments are outweighed by 
the resulting benefits.102  Regulation of the microfinance sector allows MFIs to 
reach more clients sustainably, as they are enabled to tap into commercial sources 
                                                          
Latin America.  Leslie Theodore & Jacques Trigo Loubiere, The Experience of Microfinance 
Institutions with Regulation and Supervision: Perspectives from Practitioners and a Supervisor 
(Microenterprise Best Practices, Working Draft, Oct. 2001), available at http://www.microlinks.org/ 
ev02.php?ID=7499_201&ID2=DO_TOPIC (follow “File the experience of microfinance 
institutions.pdf” hyperlink). 
90 Rhyne, supra note 82, at 1; see infra Section III (providing a detailed discussion of transitioning 
from an NGO to a formalized bank). 
91 Rhyne, supra note 82, at 2; see also CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62. 
92 Rhyne, supra note 82, at 2; see also Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 67. 
93 Rhyne, supra note 82, at 2. 
94 Id. 
95 Id.; see also ROSENGARD ET AL., supra note 50, at 1. 
96 Rhyne, supra note 82, at 3. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 See STASCHEN, supra note 31. 
100 Rhyne, supra note 82, at 3. 
101 Id. 
102 See CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 6. 
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of funding.103  Additionally, regulated MFIs enjoy more flexibility in the range of 
products (particularly savings) they can offer their clients.  As such, MFIs gain 
credibility among clients and the formal financial sector.  For these reasons, this 
comment supports the notion that the benefits to microfinance regulation outweigh 
the challenges. 
III. ASPECTS OF A SOUND LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR MICROFINANCE 
It is understood that each country should adapt its legal framework to the 
specific needs of the country.  Nevertheless, there are several principles that 
transcend borders; this section outlines four such principles.  This comment 
submits that legal and regulatory frameworks for microfinance should possess the 
following four characteristics: microfinance services integrated with formal 
financial sector; regulation based on a tiered approach; ease of transitioning from 
an NGO to a formalized bank; and no cap on interest rates. 
A. Microfinance services should be integrated with the formal financial 
sector 
Microfinance services in developing countries were initiated primarily by 
socially-conscious NGOs and multi-lateral donors.104  The sector currently remains 
dominated by such organizations.105  However, in recent years, the microfinance 
sector has been moving towards more commercial models.106  Such 
commercialization includes traditional MFIs or credit unions that have 
commercialized and become licensed financial institutions to broaden their reach, 
commercial banks expanding their services to the poor, and new MFIs established 
with the objective of operating financially sustainably.107  Littlefield and 
Rosenberg describe this recent trend: 
[F]inancial systems that serve poor clients [are] beginning to engage all kinds of 
financial institutions providing a wide range of financial service. Financial 
regulators, mainstream rating agencies, commercial and state banks, insurance 
companies, and credit bureaus are all starting to play a part in developing sound, 
inclusive financial systems that serve the majority of poor countries’ citizens. The 
                                                          
103 As MFIs move towards financial markets, they can tap into additional funding.  This funding 
will allow MFIs to expand their outreach to more clients.  See Rhyne, supra note 82. 
104 PATRICK MEAGHER, MICROFINANCE REGULATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A 
COMPARATIVE REVIEW OF CURRENT PRACTICE (IRIS 2002), http://microfinancegateway.org/files/ 
14077_14077.pdf. 
105 See CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62. 
106 ROBERT PECK CHRISTEN, COMMERCIALIZATION AND MISSION DRIFT: THE TRANSFORMATION 
OF MICROFINANCE IN LATIN AMERICA (Jan. 2001), http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-
1.9.2700/OccasionalPaper_05.pdf; see Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 38-40.  Commercial 
models refer generally to the provision of financial services to the poor by institutions that rely in part 
or whole on private sources of financing, managed so as to be financially sustainable by lending on 
economically viable terms.  See THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF MICROFINANCE: BALANCING BUSINESS 
AND DEVELOPMENT 3 (Deborah Drake & Elisabeth Rhyne eds., 2002). 
107 See CHRISTEN, supra note 106, at 4. 
2009 MICROFINANCE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 407 
 
boundaries between microfinance and the formal financial sector are breaking 
down.108 
Advocates for the commercialization of microfinance point to the limitations 
of operating on donor funds.109  In order to narrow the gulf between microfinance 
demand and supply, proponents argue that MFIs will need to become economically 
viable and tap into commercial sources of funding, particularly deposits.110  If 
outreach is a primary objective for microfinance, proponents see 
commercialization as the only viable way for rapid expansion.111  While NGOs 
and other smaller, unlicensed MFIs may continue to have an impact on the sector, 
it is generally accepted that the only way to expand services to a scale that is 
sufficient to meet the unmet demand is through commercialization.112  There is an 
emerging consensus that the growth of sustainable institutions and mobilization of 
local savings are the most likely ways to meet this unmet demand.113 
Critics raise the issue that market principles should not be introduced into 
microfinance practices, as it could lead to “mission drift,” whereby practitioners 
focus more on profits than the social benefits that microfinance originally set out to 
obtain.114  Such critics point out that financially sustainable MFIs typically have 
larger loan sizes than smaller NGOs, suggesting they do not serve the smaller 
clients.115  The argument is, therefore, that it is not possible to attain financial 
sustainability while maintaining fidelity to the poorer clients.116 
As to the critics’ argument, the available literature suggests that the dual 
objectives of financial sustainability and impact on poverty are not 
incompatible.117  Studies have shown that financially sustainable MFIs have a 
greater impact on clients’ incomes than those that are not sustainable, though the 
                                                          
108 Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 38-40. 
109 Id.; see supra note 22; see also CGAP, MAXIMIZING THE OUTREACH OF MICROENTERPRISE 
FINANCE: THE EMERGING LESSONS OF SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS (Oct. 1995), http://www.cgap.org/gm/ 
document-1.9.2548/FocusNote_02.pdf; Jones, supra note 38. 
110 See CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62; see also Robert C. Vogel et al., Microfinance 
Regulation and Supervision Concept Paper 1 (USAID 2000). 
111 See Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 38-40; see DALEY-HARRIS, supra note 21; see 
also CHRISTEN, supra note 106, at 4; Jones, supra note 38. 
112 See Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 67; see DALEY-HARRIS, supra note 21;  see also CGAP, 
MAXIMIZING THE OUTREACH OF MICROENTERPRISE FINANCE: THE EMERGING LESSONS OF 
SUCCESSFUL PROGRAMS (Oct. 1995), http://www.cgap.org/gm/document-1.9.2548/FocusNote_02.pdf; 
Jones, supra note 38. 
113 There is a large body of literature arguing this point.  See Robinson, supra note 3; see also 
Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 67; Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37; CHRISTEN, 
supra note 106, at 4. 
114 See DRAKE & RHYNE, COMMERCIALIZATION OF MICROFINANCE, 2 (2002). 
115 See CHRISTEN, supra note 106, at 4; see also DRAKE & RHYNE, supra note 105, at 4. 
116 See CHRISTEN, supra note 106, at 4 
117 See Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 67; see also CGAP, supra note 109; Jones, supra note 
38. 
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sustainable MFIs may target clients who are not as poor.118  Additionally, when 
poorer clients with small loans are shown to be an economically viable sector, 
sustainable banks typically seek to enter the sector.119  This evidence seems to 
suggest that the goals of financial sustainability and poverty reduction are 
compatible.  Therefore, introducing market principles in the microfinance sector 
does not necessarily lead to mission drift. 
As financially sustainable MFIs exemplify the feasibility of profitably 
offering financial services to the poor, integration between microfinance and the 
formal financial sector is expanding.  Most of the leading microfinance 
organizations implement similar techniques and disciplines of commercial 
finance.120  Such organizations “are investing in more sophisticated management 
and information systems, applying International Accounting Standards, contracting 
annual audits from mainstream auditing firms, and seeking ratings from 
commercial rating agencies.”121  Recognizing the successful trend towards 
commercialization, “more and more MFIs are getting licensed as banks or 
specialized finance companies, allowing them to fund themselves from capital 
markets, and from deposits that are not only a source of capital but also an 
important service to their clients.”122 
A successful legal framework will encourage microfinance involvement with 
mainstream financial markets.  Such involvement may come in the form of the 
government creating new types of financial licenses that allow for lower minimum 
capital.123  Another possibility is creating partnerships between microfinance 
institutions and commercial banks; such partnerships enable MFIs to reduce 
expenses while extending outreach and allow banks to diversify assets while 
increasing revenue and tapping new markets.124  Such initiatives allow 
microfinance to thrive, because “[t]o achieve its full potential, microfinance must 
become a fully integrated part of a developing country’s mainstream financial 
system.”125 
                                                          
118 See CGAP, FINANCIAL SUSTAINABILITY, TARGETING THE POOREST, AND INCOME IMPACT: ARE 
THERE TRADEOFFS FOR MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS? (Dec. 1996), http://www.cgap.org/gm/ 
document-1.9.2551/FocusNote_05.pdf. 
119 ROBINSON, supra note 3, at 14-17. 
120 Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 67, at 5. 
121 Id.  In 2004, rating agencies such as Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Duffs and Phelps carried 
out credit ratings of over 100 MFIs.  Id.  These credit rating agencies are companies that assign credit 
ratings to organizations that issue different types of debt obligations.  These rating agencies measure 
such things as credit worthiness and loan repayment records.  Id. 
122 Id.  The fact that MFIs are entering capital markets is evidenced by several Latin American 
MFIs’ bond issuances.  For example, Compartamos, an MFI in Mexico, raised $15 million from issuing 
a straight bond in 2002.  Id. 
123 Id. at 6. 
124 Id. 
125  Littlefield & Rosenberg, supra note 67, at.6. 
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B. Regulation should be based on a tiered approach 
The legal and regulatory framework should be flexible enough to deal with 
different institutions differently.  One way to ensure this flexibility is to 
incorporate a process of tiered regulation and supervision, within which the type 
and degree of supervision and regulation depends upon the degree of risk 
associated with the institution’s activities.126  In a tiered banking structure, “a 
range of financial intermediaries is licensed by the regulatory banking authority to 
provide banking and financial services to the public.”127  The licenses granted 
indicate limits to the services that may be offered, as well as the necessary 
prudential guidelines.128  Small, community-focused banks can function alongside 
large universal banks in a “tiered banking” structure which remains under the 
jurisdiction of the regulatory bank authority.129  The MFI’s source of funds is the 
primary factor in determining in which “tier” the institution should be 
categorized.130  MFIs can be classified into three categories: (1) MFIs which 
depend on donors or money from others, (2) MFIs that depend on money from 
their members, and (3) MFIs that leverage money from the public.131 The table 
below illustrates the tiers.132 The table identifies thresholds of financial 
intermediation activities which indicate a requirement for an MFI to meet external 
or mandatory regulatory guidelines. 
                                                          
126  GREUNING ET. AL., supra note 42, at i. 
127 Id. at 14. 
128 Id.  For example, a license will indicate whether an MFI can collect deposits from the general 
public or if it will be limited to taking deposits only from its members.  See MEAGHER, supra note 104, 
at 5; supra note 37 (discussing prudential regulation). 
129  GREUNING ET. AL., supra note 42, at 14.; see also MEAGHER, supra note 104, at 5. 
130 The source of funds refers to the source from which the MFI receives its funds, i.e. deposits, 
commercial debt or equity. See JOANNA LEDGERWOOD, MICROFINANCE HANDBOOK: AN 
INSTITUTIONAL AND FINANCIAL PERSPECTIVE 149 (World Bank 1999).   Ledgerwood provides a broad 
introduction to the financial aspects of microfinance.  She provides a wealth of information on the 
similarities and differences among microfinance and commercial banking.  Id. 
131 See GREUNING ET AL., supra note 42, at i.  MFIs leverage money from the public by offering 
savings accounts.  The MFI uses the money collected in the savings accounts as lending capital to other 
clients.  This practice is advantageous to the MFIs as they can charge a higher interest rate to the 
borrower than they pay out to the depositor. 
132 Id. at ii. 
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Regulatory action based on type of MFI133 
MFI Type Activity that 
Determines 
Regulatory 
Status 
Proposed Form of 
External Regulation, 
if Required 
Regulatory 
Agency 
Category A 
MFIs 
   
Type 1: 
Non-profit 
NGO 
Making 
microfinance 
loans not in 
excess of grants 
donated 
None—voluntary 
registration, with self-
regulatory 
organization 
None, or self-
regulatory 
organization 
Type 2: 
Non-profit 
NGO with 
limited deposit-
taking 
Taking minor 
deposits—forced 
savings or 
mandatory 
deposit schemes, 
from 
microfinance 
clients 
None—exemption or 
exclusion provision of 
banking law; 
mandatory 
registration with self-
regulatory 
organization 
Self-regulatory 
organization 
Type 3: 
NGO 
transformed 
into 
incorporated 
MFI 
Issuing 
instruments to 
generate funds 
through 
wholesale deposit 
substitutes 
(commercial 
paper, large-
value certificates 
of deposit, 
investment 
placement notes) 
Registration as 
corporate legal entity; 
authorization from 
Bank Supervisory 
Authority or 
Securities & 
Exchange Agency, 
with limitations on 
size, term and 
tradability of 
commercial paper 
instruments 
Companies’ 
Registry 
Agency; Bank 
Supervisory 
Authority or 
Securities & 
Exchange 
Agency 
Category B 
MFIs 
   
Type 4 
Credit Union, 
Savings & 
Credit 
Cooperative 
Society 
Operating as 
closed or open 
common bond 
credit union; 
deposit-taking 
from member-
clients 
Notification to and 
registration with 
Cooperatives 
Authority or Bank 
Supervisory 
Authority; or 
certification and 
Cooperatives 
Authority, or 
Bank 
Supervisory or 
Credit Rating 
Entity 
                                                          
133  ROBIN YOUNG & LAUREN MITTEN, LEGAL FRAMEWORKS AND PERFORMANCE STANDARDS FOR 
MICROFINANCE: A DESK STUDY (2000), http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/pnacj223.pdf. 
2009 MICROFINANCE LEGAL FRAMEWORK 411 
 
rating by a private 
independent credit 
rating agency 
Category C 
MFIs 
   
Type 5 
Specialized 
bank, deposit-
taking 
institution, or 
finance 
company 
Taking limited 
deposits (savings 
and fixed 
deposits) from 
general public 
beyond minor 
deposits 
exemption in 
banking law. 
Microfinance 
activities more 
extensive than 
NGOs, but 
operations not on 
scale of licensed 
banks 
Registration and 
licensing by Bank 
Supervisory 
Authority, with a 
limitation provision 
(e.g., savings and 
fixed deposits, 
smaller deposits-to-
capital multiple, 
higher liquidity 
reserves, limits on 
asset activities and 
uses) 
Bank 
Supervisory 
Authority 
Type 6 
Licensed 
mutual 
ownership bank 
Type 7 
Licensed equity 
bank 
Non-restricted 
deposit-taking 
activities, 
including 
generating funds 
through 
commercial 
paper and large-
value deposit 
substitutes, from 
the general 
public 
Registration and full 
licensing by Bank 
Supervisory 
Authority as a mutual 
ownership or equity 
bank; compliance 
with 
capitalization/capital 
adequacy 
requirements, loan 
loss provisioning and 
full prudential 
regulations 
Bank 
Supervisory 
Authority 
 
As the table indicates, there are three categories of microfinance institutions, 
distinguished by how the institution receives its primary source of funding.  
Category A MFIs use other people’s money (i.e., donors); category B MFIs use 
members’ money; and category C MFIs use the general public’s money.134  The 
categories (except for category B) consist of a variety of institutional types that 
engage in very different activities.  For example, category A includes three types 
of NGOs: 1) type one is a basic non-profit NGO that engages uniquely offering 
credit; 2) type two is a non-profit NGO that makes loans and receives minor 
deposits from clients in the community through forced savings or mandatory 
                                                          
134 See supra note 131. 
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deposit schemes; 3) type three, unlike the previous two, is an NGO that has 
evolved into an incorporated MFI, and subsequently mobilizes funds through the 
issuance of commercial paper and/or deposits.  This type poses the highest 
probability of causing systemic risk, and therefore requires the most stringent 
regulation within category A. 
The activities, and the risks associated with these activities (including the 
risks associated with how the institution obtains its funds), determine the 
regulatory status of an institution.135  No external regulation is necessary for types 
1 and 2 MFIs.  Donors, government agencies and commercial banks fund these 
MFIs, and are presumed to have the capability for institutional due diligence.136  
The institutions that receive savings from the general public pose the highest level 
of risk (to themselves and the financial system) and are therefore subject to the 
most stringent forms of regulation.137 
There is much variety among microfinance institutions.138  An effective legal 
framework for microfinance will not treat each institution the same, but will adapt 
its regulation to the varying levels of sophistication of the institution.139 
C. The framework should facilitate an easy transition from NGO to 
formalized bank 
The percentage of NGO MFIs likely to scale to wide outreach and financial 
viability is small.140  In order to achieve such objectives, MFIs need to collect 
deposits.141  Deposits can only be raised from the general public when MFIs 
undergo institutional transformation into licensed formal banking institutions 
subject to prudential regulation.142  While the microfinance industry has 
experienced operational growth, “the range of institutional channels is segmented 
by the current legal and regulatory environment in most countries.”143  A sound 
legal framework would benefit microfinance by transforming the fragmented 
spectrum into a cohesive continuum, which would enable MFIs to pursue a process 
                                                          
135 YOUNG, supra note 133, at 10. 
136 GREUNING ET. AL., supra note 42, at 12. 
137 Id. 
138 See, e.g., YOUNG, supra note 133. Some institutions receive funding from donors; others collect 
deposits from the public.  Some MFIs only offer credit, while others offer a wide range of products to 
clients.  See LEDGERWOOD, supra note 130. 
139 For example, small non-profit NGOs that do not receive deposits do not require supervision 
from a regulatory body.  See, e.g. YOUNG, supra note 133; see also supra note 37 (discussing non-
prudential regulation and systemic risk).  Larger, specialized banks with unlimited deposit-taking 
activities would require regulation from the bank supervisory authority.  See, YOUNG, supra note 133. 
140 GREUNING ET AL., supra note 42, at 9. 
141 Collecting deposits will provide a consistent source of funds for MFIs, which will allow them to 
expand their outreach more rapidly.  See supra note 24-25. 
142  GREUNING ET AL., supra note 42, at 9. 
143 Id. 
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of progressive institutional transformation.144 
The framework for banking laws “should be structured to provide MFIs with 
a clear view of the thresholds to attain on the path to institutional development and 
transformation.”145  There are several examples of NGOs that have successfully 
made the transformation into formalized banks.146  The following examples of K-
Rep Bank in Kenya and BancoSol in Bolivia are two such examples. 
1. Example of K-Rep Bank 
The Kenya Rural Enterprise Programme (K-Rep) was established in 1984 by 
World Education Inc., a private voluntary group based in the United States.147  It is 
now one of the most successful microfinance organizations in Africa, with over 
110,000 active borrowers and a gross loan portfolio of over $50 million.148  After 
K-Rep had established itself as a sound provider of microloans, management 
decided to transform its microenterprise credit program into a commercial bank.149  
K-Rep cites several objectives for this decision: 
1) Achieve institutional and financial sustainability through improved governance 
and increased profitability; 2) Balance management time between profitable 
microfinance activities and complementary services that usually require some 
degree of subsidization; 3) Gain access to additional sources of capital, particularly 
from client savings, thereby reducing K-Rep’s dependence on donor funds, 
expanding K-Rep’s market outreach, and recycling client savings to 
microenterprises rather than channeling them through traditional banks to finance 
wealthier sectors of the economy; and 4) Offer additional financial services to 
microentrepreneurs and other low-income populations.150 
In March 1999, the Central Bank of Kenya granted K-Rep a commercial 
banking license, marking a key point in financial sector development in Kenya, as 
it was the first banking license ever issued to a microfinance institution.151 
                                                          
144 Id.  This approach is outlined in the concept of tiered regulation, supra note 131. 
145 JOSELITO GALLARDO, FRAMEWORK FOR REGULATING MICROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS 13 (2002). 
146 See LEDGERWOOD, supra note 130. 
147 ROSENGARD ET. AL, supra note 50, at 1. 
148 See a financial overview of K-Rep on the website for the Mix Market, a clearing house of 
microfinance information. Mix Market, Profile of K-Rep, http://www.mixmarket.org/en/demand/ 
demand.show.profile.asp?token=&ett=956 (last visited Mar. 11, 2009). 
149 ROSENGARD ET AL., supra note 50, at 1. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 22.  Granting the banking license signified the Kenyan government’s efforts to promote 
the microfinance sector.  In the 2000 budget speech, the Kenyan Minister of Finance expressed public 
sector support for microfinance as he announced plans for the Central Bank of Kenya to establish a 
division within its banking department to assist the microfinance sector.  Id.  He further encouraged 
integration between microfinance institutions and the commercial banking sector.  Id. 
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2. Example of BancoSol 
BancoSol is one of the leading microfinance organizations in Latin America, 
with over 100,000 active borrowers and a total loan portfolio of over $160 
million.152  BancoSol is a commercial bank that is dedicated to serving the poor 
entrepreneurs of Bolivia, and is respected as the first private commercial bank to 
specialize in microfinance.153  Just as any bank in Bolivia, BancoSol operates 
under the regulatory framework of the Central Bank and is subject to prudential 
regulation.154  BancoSol distinguishes itself from the other Bolivian banks as it has 
developed its strong portfolio on well-performing microloans.155  Although 
licensed as a formal bank, BancoSol has altruistic roots.  Its majority shareholders 
are NGOs and donor organizations, and the remaining shareholders are influential 
Bolivian businessmen.156 
Founded as an NGO by the name of PRODEM, the institution transitioned to 
a formalized commercial bank in 1992.157  While the NGO was successful in 
reaching poor clients, the management recognized that their NGO status placed 
limitations on expansion by preventing access to commercial funds.158  Funds from 
the market would enable the organization to respond to clear demands for credit 
from the rural poor and to manage its cash flows better amidst seasonal variations 
of such demand.159  Additionally, the NGO was limited in the financial services it 
could provide its clients.  Specifically, it could not offer savings services and 
therefore could not generate capital through leveraging savings.160  Thus, 
BancoSol was created in order to better serve the rural poor through channeling 
sources from the commercial markets. 
Formalization as a licensed bank resulted in several advantages for 
BancoSol.  Chief among the advantages of upgrading to a commercial bank 
included: 1) the ability to mobilize funds from the market with increased 
                                                          
152 See Mix Market, Profile for Bancosol, http://www.mixmarket.org/en/demand/demand. 
show.profile.asp?token=&ett=280 (last visited Mar. 11, 2009). 
153 A. Glosser, The Creation of BancoSol in Bolivia, in THE NEW WORLD OF MICROENTERPRISE 
FINANCE 307 (Mario Otero & Elisabeth Rhyne, eds. 1994). 
154 CLAUDIO GONZALEZ-VEGA ET AL., BANCOSOL: THE CHALLENGE OF GROWTH FOR 
MICROFINANCE ORGANIZATIONS, 6 (1996), www.microfinance.com/English/Papers/Bolivia_ 
BancoSol_Growth.pdf; see supra note 37 (providing a discussion of prudential regulation). 
155 Id. 
156 Id.  International shareholders include public organizations and several NGOs: Societe 
d’Investissement de Development International, Inter-American Investment Corporation, the 
Rockefeller Foundation, the Calmeadow Foundation, and ACCION International.  Id. 
157 See Miriam J. Koreen, Banco Solidario: A New Model For Microfinance (Apr. 1999), available 
at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/2137_bancosol_pub.doc. 
158 Id. at 2.  PRODEM could not meet the growing demand for microcredit in Bolivia because the 
NGO’s source of funds was limited to donations, subsidized loans, and the interest it received from its 
lending portfolio.  Because of its NGO status, it could not access commercial sources of financing.  Id.; 
see also GONZALEZ-VEGA ET AL, supra note 154. 
159 GONZALEZ-VEGA ET AL., supra note 154, at 4; see also Glosser, supra note 153. 
160 GONZALEZ-VEGA ET AL., supra note 154, at 4. 
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flexibility, through deposits from the public, bonds placed on domestic and 
international capital markets, inter-bank loans, or access to Central Bank 
rediscounts and other lines of credit;161 2) the benefits from expanded outreach, 
realizing economies of scale;162 3) the protection offered from more intense, 
rigorous and professional monitoring of its financial performance by the regulatory 
supervisor (Superintendency of Banks), new lenders (other banks and bond 
holders), and shareholders;163 and 4) the value of a bank charter in a financial 
market with strict limitations on entry.164 
As BancoSol switched from donor funding to market-based liabilities, the 
average cost of funds increased from four percent at the time of conversion to a 
commercial bank in 1992 to twelve percent in 1996.165  While BancoSol 
experienced an increase in the cost of funds, transformation into a formal financial 
entity resulted in increased funding from the market.166  Due to its bank charter 
license, BancoSol increased the ratio of its liabilities to equity from 1.0 at the end 
of 1992 to 6.2 at the end of 1994.167  With a healthy rate of return on assets, “the 
rate of return on equity increased sharply, from 4.1 in 1992 to 13.8 in 1994, 
reflecting this higher leverage.”168 
There are certain policies to which a regulatory authority for microfinance 
should adhere while facilitating an easy transition from NGO to formalized bank.  
The amount of absolute capital to be held at all times is viewed as a very important 
regulatory measure.169  Microfinance banks should be subject to the same 
minimum capital adequacy requirements as formalized banks.170  As for 
                                                          
161 Id. at 5; see also supra notes 90 & 92. 
162 GONZALEZ-VEGA ET AL., supra note 154, at 2.  Economies of scale is an economics term that 
refers to a production process in which the increase in outreach of an organization results in a decrease 
in the average cost of each unit.  Here, BancoSol is becoming more efficient as it reaches economies of 
scale. 
163 Id. at 4. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. at 13.  This drastic increase in cost of funds is due to changing from reliance on donors and 
soft loans. At the end of 1991, about 15% of PRODEM’s liabilities were deposits; 19% were loans from 
private organizations, and the remaining 68% were soft loans from public entities.  Id.   These numbers 
changed dramatically after the transition to BancoSol: by the end of 1994, loans from public entities 
represented just 2% of total liabilities and deposits represented the majority.  Id. 
166 Id. As a commercial entity, BancoSol was able to raise funds through commercial markets, 
whereas it was limited primarily to donor funds while it operated under NGO status.  While its costs of 
funds increased, its total number of available funds also increased, easing the strain of the increased 
costs.  Id. 
167 Id. 
168 Id. 
169 STASCHEN, supra note 31, at 10.  In this detailed study, the author found that each country with 
microfinance regulation set an absolute amount of capital as one of the criteria for entry.  Id.  While 
such a requirement allows for a general standard, the author notes a potential downside: the real value 
of capital depletes over time, especially in the wake of inflation.  Id. 
170 Id. at 5.  There is no dearth of commentary that argues that microfinance banks should be able to 
maintain lower capital amounts, allowing them to transition from their NGO status more easily.  See, 
e.g. COUNTS & SOBHAN, supra note 43.    While this argument has legitimacy, it does not account for 
the relatively larger and faster impact that losses have on a microfinance bank’s capital base, as 
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management quality, the regulatory body should not require unnecessarily complex 
organizational structures or top-heavy staffing regimes for microfinance banks.171  
The regulatory authority should not impose unduly high liquidity requirements on 
microfinance banks.172  High reserve requirements would increase the cost of 
doing business for a microfinance bank by lowering the number of available 
lending capital from the institution’s deposit base.173  Several countries with a 
thriving microfinance industry place limitations on MFI product characterizations.  
The most common limitations are restrictions on the type of deposit facilities to be 
offered.174  Countries also place restrictions on lending amounts, mandating 
maximum loan sizes expressed as a percentage of capital or as a set amount.175  
Such limitations are encouraged, so long as they are reasonable and do not hinder 
innovation.  The limitations protect the financial longevity of the institution and 
maintain stability in the broader financial system. 
D. There should be no interest rate cap 
The administrative costs of managing a portfolio of many small loans are 
much higher than managing a portfolio of several large loans.176  For this reason, 
MFIs typically cannot operate sustainably unless they charge interest rates that are 
                                                          
compared to commercial banks.  See STASCHEN, supra note 31, at 5.  This argument also seems to 
neglect the fact that many microfinance banks lack geographic or loan size diversification, and are thus 
more vulnerable to institution-wide shocks.  Id.  In fact, for these reasons, some commentators suggest 
that the capital adequacy ratio should be a little higher for microfinance banks than for commercial 
banks.  See generally ROSENGARD, supra note 50.  Certain countries, such as Pakistan and Indonesia, 
have different capitalization requirements for different regions of the country.  See STASCHEN, supra 
note 31, at 11.  This rationale implies that certain regions may have higher average loan sizes or may be 
more vulnerable to systemic economic shocks. 
171 ROSENGARD, supra note 50, at 5.  A key to the success of a microfinance institution is its 
simplicity in organization and operations in order to ensure the financial stability of the bank.  While 
the management requirements should not be too complex, it would be prudent to insist on an 
organizational structure that separates key functions for internal controls such as bookkeeping and 
cashiering. It is similar rationale for reporting requirements.  “Standard statistical reports are usually 
designed for banks with a wide variety of extremely diverse and sophisticated services, while most 
microfinance banks offer a limited range of simple products.”  Id. at 26.  Therefore, many commercial 
banking reporting requirements are inapplicable to microfinance banks, and should be adapted to the 
specific needs of microfinance.  Specifically, documentation requirements should be simplified, in order 
to accommodate the high volume of small loans.  Id. at 5. 
172 Id. 
173 Id.; see also COUNTS & SOBHAN, supra note 43 (arguing that the minimum liquidity requirement 
for microfinance institutions should not exceed 25% of the total available funds). 
174 STASCHEN, supra note 31, at 18.  For example, in Ghana, non-bank financial institutions, other 
than credit unions and savings institutions, can only take term deposits.  Id.  It is common for countries 
to limit deposit-taking by cooperatives from members of the cooperative.  Id.  In Nepal, cooperatives 
are subject to a restricted duration for savings and time deposits of three years; cooperatives in Uganda 
are not restricted to any duration limits on such deposits.  Id. 
175 Id.  For example, in Ethiopia, MFIs are only permitted to lend up to a fixed amount of $600 to a 
single borrower.  Id. In Indonesia, regulatory authorities are leery of one borrower causing systemic 
problems as MFIs are limited to lending 20% of their total capital to a single borrower.  Id. 
176 Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37, at 11. 
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substantially higher than the rates banks charge their traditional borrowers.177  It is 
simply a matter of costs.  Relative to the amount of money lent, small loans cost 
more to manage than big ones.178  Even for the most efficiently managed MFIs, it 
is difficult to reduce administrative costs below about ten to twenty-five percent 
(depending on loan size, methodology, and local market forces) of their 
portfolio.179  By contrast, comparable costs in an efficient developing country 
commercial bank are typically below five percent.180  A financially sustainable 
MFI, therefore, must “charge an interest rate that could sound obscene in the 
normal commercial-bank market or in the arena of political discussion.”181  The 
poor borrowers of microcredit loans have shown for many years that they are 
happy for access to loans, even at higher rates.182 
Microcredit loan cycles are usually shorter than traditional commercial 
loans.183  A typical loan term is six months to a year with payments plus interest 
due weekly.184  Shorter loan cycles and weekly payments help the borrowers stay 
current and avoid overwhelmingly large payments.  The transaction-intense nature 
of weekly payment collections, often in rural areas, is more expensive than running 
a bank that provides large loans to financially stable borrowers in a metropolitan 
area.185  Consequently, MFIs must charge interest rates that might sound high—the 
average global rate is about thirty-five percent annually—to cover their costs.186 
For a financial institution to scale and remain sustainable, at a bare minimum 
it has to cover its costs.  In the example below, a large bank can charge anything 
over fourteen percent to recoup its costs, whereas the MFI has to charge a rate of at 
least thirty-one percent to cover its costs.187 
                                                          
177 Id. 
178 CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 7; see also Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, 
supra note 37, at 13. 
[A]dministrative costs do not vary in proportion to the amount lent.  One may be 
able to make a $20,000 loan while spending only $600 (3 percent) in 
administrative costs; but this does not mean that administrative costs for a $200 
loan will be only $6.  In comparison with the amount lent, administrative costs 
are inevitably much higher for microcredit than for conventional bank loans. 
Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37, at 10. 
179 CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, supra note 62, at 7. 
180 Id.  This is a conservative number; many commercial banks have administrative costs that are 
well below 5 percent.  Id. 
181 Id. 
182 Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37, at 11; see also CHRISTEN & ROSENBERG, 
supra note 62. 
183 See LEDGERWOOD, supra note 130. 
184 See Unitus, supra note 9. 
185 See LEDGERWOOD, supra note 130. 
186 Id. 
187 This table demonstrates the differences in costs of administering a loan for a large bank and a 
microfinance institution.  The numbers are based on a loan amount of $1,000,000, and the number of 
loans is based off of estimates of an average loan size per client.  Unitus, supra note 9. 
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Cost of Administering a Loan188 
 Large Banks Microfinance 
Institutions 
Cost of Capital 10% 10% 
Loan loss provision 1% 1% 
Total Cost of Capital 11% 11% 
Total amount of loan disbursed $1,000,000 $1,000,000 
Loan size $1,000,000 $100 
Number of loans 1 10,000 
Yearly transactions 4-12 120,000-520,000 
Cost of administering loan 3% 20% 
Total cost to institution 14% 31% 
 
Public officials and the general public seldom grasp this dynamic and they 
are therefore suspicious of microcredit interest rates, even in cases where the rates 
do not reflect excessive profits or inefficiency.189  Policy makers in several 
developing countries have limited interest rates.190  For example, in Bolivia, the 
limit on the interest rate charged on loans is three percent per month.191  The 
objective is to protect the poor from aggressive lenders, but such intentions often 
backfire.  When MFIs are required to charge a pre-determined interest rate, which 
is usually much below the cost that the MFI incurs, MFIs are often forced to go out 
of business.192  As a result, those whom the MFI would have served are left 
without access to any financial services at all.  This type of regulation often is a 
disservice to the very people it is meant to protect.193  If government officials 
control microcredit interest rates, “practical politics will usually make it difficult to 
set an interest rate cap high enough to permit the development of sustainable 
microcredit.”194  Interest rate caps usually hurt the poor—by limiting services—
more than they help the poor by the lower rates.195 
While usury limits are counter-productive, policy makers may resort to 
alternative means of protecting poor borrowers.196  In regions where deception is 
                                                          
188 Id.  There are many aspects that determine an institution’s interest rate.   See RICHARD 
ROSENBERG, MICROCREDIT INTEREST RATES (Nov. 2002), http://www.microfinancegateway.org/ 
content/article/detail/1827 (providing additional discussion of interest rate calculations).  The numbers 
in this table are simply examples to show the difference in costs to an MFI and to a commercial bank. 
189 Sometimes high interest rates are reflective of high administrative costs and inefficient 
management.  See Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37, at 13. 
190 FLEISIG & DE LA PEÑA, supra note 4, at 27. 
191 Id. 
192 See LEDGERWOOD, supra note 130. 
193 See COUNTS & SOBHAN,  supra note 43;  see also Unitus, supra note 9., 
194 Microfinance Consensus Guidelines, supra note 37, at 13. 
195 Id. 
196 FLEISIG & DE LA PEÑA, supra note 4, at 27. 
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common, regulations may be imposed that require lenders to provide clear 
statements of true annual interest rates to their clients.197  Suggestions include 
providing numerical examples of what the interest rates mean, and protecting 
illiterate clients by requiring a videotape presentation in the client’s native 
language of the implications of such interest rates.198 
In sum, there should be no cap on interest rates. Because of the necessarily 
high administrative costs, microcredit programs may—at least initially—need to 
charge interest rates that are higher than the rates in commercial banking 
transactions.  Such interest rate caps could stifle microfinance expansion, and 
would therefore prevent poor households from access to credit. 
IV. THE MICROCREDIT REGULATORY ACT OF 2006 
The first three sections of this comment have provided a guideline for the 
regulation of microfinance.  The final section provides an example of an effective 
microfinance law.199  While several countries have designed laws specifically for 
microfinance regulation,200  Bangladesh stands apart as one of the first to establish 
an independent regulatory institution with the sole purpose of supervising the 
microfinance sector.201  The Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006 is an effective 
legislative model that other countries should emulate. 
Microfinance is a familiar concept in Bangladesh.  Since Dr. Yunus began 
lending money in 1976, the movement has gained tremendous momentum.202  The 
twenty largest MFIs in Bangladesh reach twenty-one million clients affecting 105 
million family members in a country of 140 million.203  Nearly ninety percent of 
the microloan clients are female and the average loan amount is $60.204  The 
                                                          
197 Id. 
198 Id. 
199 The government of Bangladesh passed the law in 2006.  See infra note 210.  Bangladesh is 
commonly referred to as the “birthplace of microfinance.”  See Nick Louth, How to Help the Third 
World With eBay, UK MSN MONEY, Nov. 15, 2007, available at http://money.uk.msn.com/investing/ 
articles/nicklouth/article.aspx?cp-documentid=6699608.  As such, it appears fitting to analyze the 
country’s progress towards a legal framework for microfinance. 
200 See supra note 32. 
201 In this regard, Bangladesh is a rather pioneering example.  Some commentators argue that the 
establishment of an independent regulatory body is essential to an effective legal framework for 
microfinance.  See, e.g., COUNTS AND SORBAM, supra note 43; see also Microfinance Consensus 
Guidelines, supra note 37.  As discussed, microfinance regulation is a daunting task.  See supra note 60.  
When an institution is established for the sole purpose of microfinance regulation, it is able to focus its 
efforts. 
202 While not a panacea, microfinance has positively impacted the rural poor of Bangladesh.  In a 
study for the World Bank, Shahidur Khandker’s research of three Bangladeshi MFIs found that 
microcredit accounted for 40% of the entire reduction of moderate poverty in rural Bangladesh.  See 
Sam Daley-Harris et al., Debate on Microcredit, FPIF, June 21, 2007, http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4324.  
Additionally, Khandker’s study found that microcredit’s spillover effects among non-participants 
reduced poverty among this group by some 1% annually for moderate poverty and 1.3% annually for 
extreme poverty.  Id. 
203 Id. 
204 See Microfinance Institutions (MFIs), http://www.bangladesh-bank.org/fnansys/mfi.html.  It is a 
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payback rate in the microfinance industry in Bangladesh is astounding, averaging 
over ninety percent.205 
As MFIs typically provide financial services to the poor outside the formal 
banking system, the issue of a regulatory framework has come to the forefront of 
political discussions.206  The unique features of MFIs in the field of social and 
financial services with the core objectives of poverty alleviation differentiate the 
industry from the formal financial sector.  However, that does not in any way 
downplay the importance of having some strategic monitoring measures that are 
compatible and appropriate to MFIs’ objectives, institutional operation and 
development culture.207 
The phenomenal growth of the microfinance sector in terms of outreach and 
product development encouraged the government to form a consortium of scholars 
and practitioners to formulate guidelines for a microfinance regulatory 
framework.208  The Microfinance Research and Reference Unit (the Unit) was 
established in 2000, under the supervision of a National Steering Committee 
headed by the Governor of the Bangladesh Bank.209  After much consultation with 
experts in the sector, the Committee submitted a draft of a regulatory framework to 
the government.  The government passed a law, the Microcredit Regulatory Act of 
2006 (the Act), in July 2006.210  Under this law the government established a 
separate Microcredit Regulatory Authority (MRA) and constituted its board of 
directors, with the governor of the Bangladesh Bank as the chairperson.211 
The law grants broad powers to the Microcredit Regulatory Authority and 
requires all active MFIs to apply for a license from the MRA.212  To be considered 
for a license, MFIs must complete an application and submit it to the MRA office 
                                                          
consensus among practitioners that lending to women is more beneficial to the family than lending to 
men.  See Muhammad Yunus, Social Enterprise: Doing Well by Doing Good, 1 PEPP. J. BUS., 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 99 (2007) (providing an explanation of this phenomenon); see also supra note 
17. 
205 See Bank of Bangladesh’s Microfinance Institutions Page, supra note 204. 
206 See W.A. Wijewardena, Microfinance Policy and Regulatory Framework: Experience and 
Perspective of South Asian Region – Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Nepal and India (Islamabad, Pakistan: 
MicroFinance in Pakistan: Innovating & Mainstreaming Conf., 2004), available at 
http://www.microfinancegateway.com/files/22945_Microfinance_Policy_and_Regulatory_Framework_
by_Wije_Wardena.pdf. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. 
209 Id.  Initially this Committee prepared a set of guidelines which were implemented by the Unit. 
See Bangladesh Bank Financial System Overview, http://www.bangladesh-bank.org/fnansys/mfi.html 
(last visited Mar. 11, 2009).  Those guidelines helped the sector prepare for a future regulatory 
environment and establish a friendly communication between the sector and the policy makers.  Id. 
210 Id.  A full text version of the bill is available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/ 
37487_file_Bangladesh_Micro_Credit_Regulatory_Authority_Act_2006.pdf. 
211 See Bank of Bangladesh Financial System Overview, supra note 208.  The Microcredit 
Regulatory Authority is an independent organization that is charged with the responsibility of 
supervising and regulating the microfinance sector in Bangladesh. 
212 See Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006, available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/ 
files/37487_file_Bangladesh_Micro_Credit_Regulatory_Authority_Act_2006.pdf. 
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at the Bangladesh Bank.213  The MRA then examines the application to evaluate 
the MFI’s source of funds, ownership, and internal governance.214  The law states 
that all institutions engaging in microcredit operations should separate their 
financial operations from other development works and keep their accounts 
separate.215  The law authorizes the MRA to monitor and supervise all licensed 
MFIs.216  The MRA also has the power to prepare detailed rules related to 
microcredit operations, including: conditions for spending any income, 
geographical areas of operations, guidelines on internal and external account 
audits, collection of deposits, and use of earned profit.217  The MRA has the 
mandate to take punitive measures if any institution does not comply with any of 
the provisions of law and rules.218 
The Microcredit Regulatory Act was passed in order to create a beneficial 
environment for microfinance institutions in Bangladesh.219  For the following 
reasons, the law will prove successful. 
The Microcredit Regulatory Act fares well with the four suggestions for a 
sound legal framework for microfinance discussed in section two of this comment.  
The first suggestion encourages microfinance integration with the formal financial 
sector.220  The law permits deposit mobilization, which allows institutions to raise 
more capital in order to reach more clients.221  Additionally, the law encourages 
future integration with the formal financial sector by requiring institutions to abide 
by internationally approved accounting standards.222  The second suggestion 
                                                          
213 Email from Lila Rachid, Managing Director of the Microcredit Regulatory Authority (Jan. 26, 
2008, 22:49 PST) (on file with author). 
214 See Steven Craig, Bangladesh Micro Credit Regulatory Authority Begins Issuance of Licenses to 
Microfinance Institutions, MICROCAPITAL, Aug. 15 2007,  available at http://microcapitalmonitor.com/ 
cblog/index.php?/archives/1079-MICROCAPITAL-STORY-Bangladesh-Micro-credit-Regulatory-Auth 
ority-Begins-Issuance-of-Licenses-to-Microfinance-Institutions.html#extended.  The MRA determines 
the type of regulation based on the institution’s source of funds.  See LEDGERWOOD, supra note 130.  
The MRA examines the background of executive team members and refuses to license individuals with 
fraudulent or bankrupt histories.  See infra note 233. 
215 See Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006, available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/ 
files/37487_file_Bangladesh_Micro_Credit_Regulatory_Authority_Act_2006.pdf. 
216 Id. 
217 Id. 
218 Id. 
219 Id. 
220 See supra note 103. 
221 See supra note 110 (providing a discussion of deposit mobilization).  Additionally, the law 
facilitates mergers between smaller MFIs and larger banks, allowing MFIs to tap into commercial 
markets through mergers.  See infra note 227. 
222 Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006, available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/ 
files/37487_file_Bangladesh_Micro_Credit_Regulatory_Authority_Act_2006.pdf. Such requirements 
prepare institutions for future integration with formal financial markets because they will learn to apply 
the same information systems as their counterparts in the formal sector.  This will enable commercial 
institutions to have confidence in the MFIs’ bookkeeping, thereby increasing their likelihood to conduct 
business with the MFIs.  Additionally, if MFIs and commercial institutions implement comparable 
accounting systems, it will facilitate the process of MFIs merging with commercial banks.  See infra 
note 227. 
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promotes a tiered approach to regulation.223  Under Bangladesh’s microfinance 
law, MFIs are regulated differently, depending on the institution’s size.224  
Minimum capital requirements are based on the institution’s geographic 
outreach.225  The third suggestion encourages a legal framework that facilitates an 
easy transition from NGO to formalized bank.226  While the law does not 
specifically provide an easy transition from NGO to formalized bank status, it does 
facilitate the process of MFIs merging with larger banks.227  Such mergers enable 
MFIs to reduce costs while expanding outreach and allow banks to diversify assets 
while entering new markets and increasing revenue.228  The final suggestion 
discourages interest rate limits.229  The Microcredit Regulatory Act is silent on 
interest rates, thereby allowing institutions and the market to determine optimal 
rates.230 
In addition to satisfying the four suggestions, the Microcredit Regulatory Act 
contains other positive aspects for the microfinance regulatory environment in 
Bangladesh.  Proponents of microfinance regulation encourage policy-makers to 
establish an independent body dedicated to supervising the sector.231  As noted,232 
                                                          
223 See supra note 125. 
224 Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006, available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/ 
37487_file_Bangladesh_Micro_Credit_Regulatory_Authority_Act_2006.pdf. 
225 See id.  For example, if an institution operates in all of Bangladesh’s districts, the institution will 
have a higher minimum capital requirement than one operating in just one district. 
226 See supra note 139.  The original bill proposal from the Microfinance Research and Reference 
Unit to the government contained a provision outlining such a transition.  Email from Lila Rachid, 
supra note 212.  The government did not approve the provision, reasoning that establishment of the 
Microcredit Regulatory Authority was a bold move, and that legislation for microfinance regulation 
should move one step at a time.  Id.  The members of parliament explained that they want to move 
cautiously on microfinance regulation.  After evaluating the effectiveness of the Microcredit Regulatory 
Authority, parliament members will re-visit the provision for an easy transition from NGO to formal 
bank status.  Interview with Lila Rachid, Managing Director of the Microcredit Regulatory Authority, 
in Dhaka, Bangladesh (Jun. 10, 2007).  Dr. Yunus, whose Grameen Bank is the only formalized bank 
conducting microfinance operations in Bangladesh, was a strong proponent of this provision.  Id.  
Understandably, Dr. Yunus carries tremendous political influence in the country; as such, practitioners 
are optimistic that the parliament will soon adopt a provision to the law that will facilitate easy 
transition from NGO to formalized bank status. 
227 Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006, available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/ 
files/37487_file_Bangladesh_Micro_Credit_Regulatory_Authority_Act_2006.pdf. 
228 See supra note 105; see also supra note 190. 
229 See supra note 176. 
230 Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006, available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/ 
files/37487_file_Bangladesh_Micro_Credit_Regulatory_Authority_Act_2006.pdf.  It has long been the 
policy of the Bangladesh Bank to allow financial service providers to compete freely regarding interest 
rates.  See Bank of Bangladesh, http://www.bangladesh-bank.org/fnansys/fnansys.html. 
231 See, e.g., COUNTS & SOBHAN, supra note 43 (proposing central banks establish an independent 
supervisory body to regulate the microfinance sector). The rationale for this argument is rooted in the 
complexity of microfinance regulation.  It is difficult for a banking supervisory body to regulate the 
commercial banking sector as well as microfinance.  See id.  Microfinance regulation is a daunting task, 
and involves detailed analysis of thousands of institutions.  As of January 2008, the MRA had received 
applications from 4,000 institutions.  Email from Lila Rachid, supra note 212.  The MRA follows a 
thorough process before granting a license.  For instance, the MRA considers whether the institution has 
followed the detailed registration requirements of the Microcredit Regulatory Act; whether the 
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the Microcredit Regulatory Act established the Microcredit Regulatory Authority, 
an independent microfinance supervisor.  The law also promotes institutional 
transparency and stability of the microfinance sector.  Under the law, no executive 
of an institution can have an unlawful or even a financially unstable 
background.233  Each institution must abide by internationally recognized 
accounting standards and submit annual financial statements to the MRA.234  
While there is no requirement of minimum capital adequacy, the MRA notes the 
importance of establishing minimum liquid reserve requirements.235  Finally, each 
institution is required to establish a reserve fund, so as to ensure long-term 
solvency.236  The principles of the Act enable the institutions to thrive financially, 
protect the MFIs’ borrowers and promote stability in the microfinance sector.  As 
such the Microcredit Regulatory Act provides a model for other countries to 
follow. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Will the eighty to ninety percent of the population who are excluded from 
the formal banking sector in developing countries be able to receive financial 
services?  The answer depends in large part on whether sound legal frameworks 
for microfinance are established.  There are many costs and benefits to 
microfinance regulation.  Balancing the two, the benefits outweigh the costs, so 
long as sound practices are followed.237  As countries undertake efforts to establish 
a framework for microfinance, the Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006 is an 
example of an effective law that will provide a favorable legal framework for 
microfinance. 
                                                          
institution has bona fide operations at the field level; whether it has adopted approved accounting and 
management information systems; and whether it has a properly functioning executive body.  Id. 
232 See supra note 200. 
233 Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006, available at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/ 
37487_file_Bangladesh_Micro_Credit_Regulatory_Authority_Act_2006.pdf.  In addition, the MRA 
can pass a written order for an executive to step down if he or she is involved in prejudicial practices, or 
if he or she causes any public harm.  Id.  Each executive must submit, on behalf of the institution, a 
constitution to the MRA and the MRA must approve any changes to the document.  Id. 
234 Id.  The MRA has the authority to see any documents and visit any projects it deems necessary.  
Id.  The MRA also has liberal permission to impose fines and it can even seize documents if there is any 
suspicious activity.  Id. 
235 Email from Lila Rachid, supra note 212; see also Microcredit Regulatory Act of 2006, available 
at http://www.microfinancegateway.org/files/37487_file_Bangladesh_Micro_Credit_Regulatory_Autho 
rity_Act_2006.pdf.  A minimum liquid reserve requirement serves the purpose of ensuring the overall 
solvency of the institution, by requiring the institution to maintain a certain percentage of its total 
capital in liquid form. Commentators suggest that minimum standard liquidity requirements for 
microfinance should not exceed 25%.  See, e.g., COUNTS & SOBHAN, supra note 43. 
236 Id.  A reserve fund is a safety net for the institution, and requirements typically require financial 
institutions to maintain a certain percentage of its total assets in the fund.  See LEDGERWOOD, supra 
note 130. 
237 For example, practices such as those outlined in section II of this comment: Microfinance 
services should be integrated with the formal financial sector; regulation should be based on a tiered 
approach; the framework should facilitate an easy transition from NGO to formalized bank status; and 
there should be no interest rate cap. It should be noted that this list of four suggestions is not exhaustive. 
